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holds, a home visit is not a search under the fourth amendment,
there seem to be no grounds for exclusion. The fourth amendment
has certainly lost much of its meaning if an individual can be sub-
jected to a criminal prosecution based on evidence obtained during a
visit which she permitted solely in order to avoid losing her and her
childrens' only means of subsistence.
The immediate practical effects of James will not be substantial.
Home visits have long been a common practice of welfare depart-
ments. Any decisions to refrain from or limit home visits in the
past have resulted from a lack of personnel rather than a fear of
illegality. Thus, James' major impact will be on the future role of
the fourth amendment. James has effectively limited the rule of
Camara and See to situations where it is illegal to refuse to allow the
administrative search. And it has distinguished "visits" that are
"in a sense ... investigative" from searches "in the traditional crim-
inal law context." It can be safely said that James has provided the
seeds for a redefinition of the scope of the fourth amendment.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS -
DISTRAINT
Santiago v. McElroy,
319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
Pennsylvania has a distraint statute which allows a landlord to
summarily seize a tenant's chattels and compel their judicial sale to
satisfy a delinquent rent obligation.' Pursuant to the Pennsylvania
statute, two low income tenants were served first with notices of dis-
traint forbidding removal of their chattels from the premises and
subsequently with notices of the impending sale of those chattels.
The tenants sought relief under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871,2 which creates a cause of action for the deprivation of
constitutional rights by persons acting under color of law. Injunc-
1PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.302-.313 (1965).
242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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tive relief was requested by the tenants on behalf of themselves and
all low and moderate income tenants residing in the city of Phila-
delphia on the grounds that the performance of levies and sales by
the defendant court officials violated the equal protection and due
process clauses of the 14th amendment. In Santiago v. McElroy,'
a three-judge court held that statutory distress sales in the absence
of a prior hearing to determine the validity of the landlord's claim
violate the fundamental principles of due process of law.
Initially, the court noted that the tenants were challenging a
procedure of ancient origin. The right of distress was originally
a common law form of self-help which permitted landlords to seize
and hold a defaulting tenant's chattels as a means of persuading the
tenant to meet his rent obligation. In the latter part of the 17th
century, an English statute gave the landlord the right, under certain
circumstances, to satisfy his claim by selling the distrained chattels. 4
Statutes have been enacted in this country authorizing seizure and
sale of tenants' chattels.5 These statutes vest control over the sale in
a public official, usually the sheriff.'
Finding that distraint presented a unique situation in Santiago,
the court specifically defined the plaintiff class seeking redress as
the class of low income tenants, there being no showing that dis-
traint presented the same hardships to moderate income tenants.'
The court initially found that the plaintiffs had not sustained
their burden of showing that the levy and steps taken prior to the
sale had caused them any injury. Thus, the court restricted its in-
quiry to whether the statutory authorization of the sale of the ten-
ant's property after distress violated the 14th amendment. The
court found sufficient state action to bring the case within the scope
3 31 9 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
4 Sale of Distress Act of 1689, 2 W & M. 1, c. 5, § 2. Sale was permitted if the ten-
ant had not replevied his property with sufficient security within 5 days after he received
notice of the distress.
5 See statutes cited note 11 infra.
6 See statutes cited note 11 infra; Comment, The Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant
Act of 1951, 13 U. PIrT. L REv. 396, 400-01, 403 (1952).
7319 F. Supp. at 290-91. The court defined low income tenants as those who qual-







Six hundred dollars should be added for each additional family member. Revised OEO
Income Property Guidelines, OEO Instruction 6004-1a (Jan. 30, 1970).
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of the 14th amendment in the statutory authorization of public of-
ficials to sell a tenant's chattels after distress. And because public
officials perform the sales and have the power to do so because they
are officials, the sales are performed under color of law as required
by section 1983.
In order to determine whether the requirements of due process
were met in Santiago, the court focused on Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp.8 In Sniadach, which dealt with wage garnishment pro-
ceedings, the Supreme Court identified wages as a specialized type
of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.
Wage garnishment, often based upon a fraudulent debt, frequently
drove a wage earner below the poverty income level and forced him
to settle the alleged debt to recover his full wages and alleviate the
threat of being fired. Because of the potential ramifications of wage
garnishments, the Court held that to justify a prejudgment taking,
the state must show an extraordinary situation requiring special
protection to the state or creditor interest involved, and must draw
its statute so narrowly as to meet only the unusual condition.
The Santiago court found the Sniadach rule directly on point.
Under Pennsylvania's distaint statute, a landlord may levy upon and
sell a tenant's personal property upon the unilateral claim that
rent is owing. The tenant's available remedies of actions in trespass
or replevin could not ameliorate the harm caused by distraint. If
the tenant sued in trespass, his property would probably be sold long
before a decision on the merits of the landlord's claim. The tenant
would be deprived of his property until the claim was decided, and
even if he won on the merits he would only be able to get back the
value of the seized property. The tenant can regain possession of
his chattels immediately by posting a bond equal to twice their value
and suing in replevin,' but he is then deprived of the bond until a
decision on the merits.
The court found that Pennsylvania did not meet the Sniadach
requirements because the state had not demonstrated that the
grievous loss inflicted upon tenants by the distress procedure was a
response to an extraordinary situation; there was no evidence to indi-
cate that in the case of tenants a greater need existed for ensuring
an available fund for collection purposes than in the case of other
debtors. Further, there was no evidence to indicate that distress
was central to the state's interest in protecting the housing market.
8 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.306 (1965); id. tit. 12, § 1824.
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In the absence of such an extraordinary situation, the court held that
Pennsylvania could not continue to deprive tenants of their property
solely upon the landlord's unilateral claim that rent is in arrears.
Santiago appears to be a second step in the expansion of Snia-
dach. The implicit limitation of the Sniadach holding to wages as a
special type of property was first expanded in Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co.10 In Laprease a three-judge court applied the Snia-
dach holding to replevies of certain property purchased on install-
ment contracts. The property consisted of a bed, mattresses, a dinette
set, a chest, and other household furnishings. The court held that
the taking of this furniture and other necessaries for ordinary day-
to-day living was identical to the taking of wages in Sniadach be-
cause of the egregious hardships it imposed upon the purchasers.
Thus, the court required a hearing before the goods could be repos-
sessed.
Santiago extends the Sniadach holding to a third type of prop-
erty - all personal property located on the premises of a tenant -
but focuses on low income tenants. Thus, Santiago is not really a
departure from the specialized type of property limitation found in
both Sniadach and Laprease. The court implicitly found that where
low income tenants are involved, all personal property is of a spe-
cialized type, no different from the household necessities focused on
in Laprease. Two questions immediately arise from a reading of
Santiago: (1) Does the decision mark the beginning of a judicial
trend to apply more stringent requirements of due process where the
property of a poor person is at issue? and (2) Is it a significant step
in the extention of Sniadach to eventually prohibit prejudgment sei-
zures of all types of property? The answers to both of these ques-
tions lie in how carefully the courts are willing to continue to examine
traditional creditor remedies in light of expanding concepts of pro-
cedural due process.
There are currently 11 states that have statutory distraint proce-
dures similar to those in Pennsylvania." Under the Santiago rule,
10 315 F. Supp. 717 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). For a contrary decision on similar facts,
see Fuentes v. Fairdoth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juiis. noted, 400
U.S. 906 (1971) (No. 6060).
"DEL. CODE ANN. ti. 25, §§ 5501, 5515 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-401
to -403 (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, §§ 16-23 (Smith-Hurd 1966); LA. Civ.
CODB ANN. arts. 2705, 3218-19 (West 1952); ID. CODE ANN. art 53, §§ 9-21 (1957);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 441.300 (1949); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:33 (1951); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 61-6-5, 61--8 (1953); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-151 to -165 (1962); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5222-27, 5238-39 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-6-9,
37-6-12 (1966).
19711
